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IMAGINING A FREE PRESS 
Geoffrey R. Stone* 
IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS. By Lee c. Bollinger. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 1991. Pp. xii, 209. $22.50. 
No thoughtful person can be satisfied with the current state of our 
political process. Effective political communication is too expensive. 
Money and incumbency play too large a role in the process. Citizens 
have little or no access to unorthodox or radical points of view. Polit-
ical debate is superficial; we are mired in an era of politics - and 
government - by sound bite. The press self-indulges in the virtually 
unrestrained disclosure of gossip and ~uendo about the private lives 
of political candidates and routinely treats political campaigns as 
sporting events, denigrating the candidates and the process alike. 
Although the causes of these problems are complex, there can be 
little doubt that at least some share of the responsibility belongs to the 
press. What can we do to improve its performance? To what extent 
does the Constitution, and particularly the freedom of the press guar-
antee of the First Amendment, preclude government regulation 
designed to redress the press' failures? The First Amendment was 
adopted at least in part to ensure a well-functioning democratic pro-
cess. Does the First Amendment today promote or hinder that goal? 
In Images of a Free Press, Dean Lee C. Bollinger1 aspires "to en-
large our vision of the idea of freedom of the press" (p. xii) with an eye 
toward enabling government to improve the quality of public debate. 
Revisiting themes he first explored some fifteen years ago,2 Bollinger 
now adds further to our understanding of the complex relationship 
among the First Amendment, the Supreme Court, the public, the press 
and the democratic process. This is a work of insight, sensitivity, and 
power. Bollinger has a profound knowledge of and a deep affection for 
his subject, and it shows. 
I 
Dean Bollinger's analysis can be divided into six separate steps. I 
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Professor of Law and Dean, University of Chicago Law School. B.S. 
1968, Pennsylvania; J.D. 1971, University of Chicago. - Ed. I would like to thank Anne-Marie 
Burley, Abner Greene, Larry Lessig, David Strauss, Elena Kagan, and Cass Sunstein for their 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this review. 
1. Dean, University of Michigan Law School. 
2. Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial 
Regulation of the Mass Media, 15 MICH. L. RE.v. 1 (1976). 
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will consider each in turn. Bollinger begins with what he describes as 
the "central image" of freedom of the press in the United States today. 
According to Bollinger, this image received itS richest articulation in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 3 in which the Court identified a fun-
damental conflict in our constitutional scheme: The primary function 
of freedom of the press is to support the societal choice for a demo-
cratic form of government, but the very government that is established 
in this scheme will inevitably attempt to suppress speech that threat-
ens its power. In Bollinger's view, Sullivan structured the "central 
image" of press freedom around this basic insight. The critical fea-
tures of this image are that (a) "the government is untrustworthy 
when it regulates public debate"; (b) the citizens are "the ultimate sov-
ereign"; (c) "open debate must be preserved for their benefit"; and (d) 
"the press is the public's representative . . . helping stand guard 
against the atavistic tendencies of the state" (p. 20). Bollinger notes 
that the consequence of this central image is that ''whenever public 
regulation touches the press the alarm will be sounded. And the now 
conventional cry will issue that, when it comes to the .press, the gov-
ernment must keep its hands off" (p. 21). In a long series of decisions 
since Sullivan, the Court has consistently reinforced and reaffirmed 
this "autonomy-based" conception of press freedom.4 
This "central image" of freedom of the press is the book's primary 
target. Bollinger's core theme is that the reality of press freedom in 
the United States is significantly more complex than this conception 
indicates and that what is needed is "a more sophisticated model of 
quality public debate, in which there is some room for public institu-
tions to . . . help moderate tendencies . . . that distort and bias the 
process of public discussion and decision making" (p. 23). 
Bollinger is clearly accurate in his description of the "central im-
age." He is on less solid ground, however, in tracing this image so 
emphatically to Sullivan. The Court's protection of press freedom did 
not begin with Sullivan. To the contrary, the Court had forcefully 
articulated a similar, though less complete, vision of press freedom 
much earlier, in cases like Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson 5 and Gros-
jean v. American Press Co. 6 Moreover, and more important, the "cen-
tral image" that Bollinger ascribes to Sullivan really has nothing to do 
with freedom of the press, as such. Rather, it is essentially a restate-
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
4. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (intentional infliction of 
emotional distress); Minnesota Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commr. of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575 (1983) (taxation); Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (free press/fair trial); 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (privacy); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974) Qibel); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (right-
of-reply); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (national security). 
5. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
6. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
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ment, with minor modification, of the central image of freedom of 
speech. This image originates, not in Sullivan, but in the dissenting 
opinions of Justice Holmes in Abrams7 and Gitlow, 8 in Justice Bran-
deis' concurring opinion in Whitney, 9 and in a host of other decisions 
involving freedom of speech, such as Lovell v. City of Griffin, 10 Termi-
niello v. Chicago, 11 and Cantwell v. Connecticut. 12 
Indeed, Sullivan itself was not about freedom of the press, as dis-
tinct from freedom of speech. It did not articulate a new "image" of 
press freedom; it drew upon and strengthened a tradition of freedom 
of speech and press that was already deeply rooted in our general First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Sullivan's skepticism about government 
regulation of expression, which is so central to Bollinger's "central im-
age" of freedom of the press, derives from our general free speech tra-
dition and not from any special concerns about the press. Moreover, 
although Bollinger sees Sullivan as a decision about freedom of the 
press, the Court both before and after Sullivan has consistently and 
with good reason resisted the invitation to embrace a separate and dis-
tinct conception of press freedom - for otherwise, the Court would 
have had to determine whether Abrams' flyers, Gitlow's manifesto, 
Lovell's leaflets, and Cantwell's phonograph constituted "speech" or 
"press" within the meaning of the First Amendment, and something 
of consequence would have had to tum on the outcome of this not 
very promising inquiry. 
This is not a trivial point. In Images of a Free Press, Dean Bollin-
ger asks us to jettison Sullivan's "central image" of press freedom and 
to replace it with "a more sophisticated model of quality public de-
bate, in which there is some room for public institutions to ... help 
moderate tendencies . . . that distort and bias the process of public 
discussion and decision making" (p. 23). But if this "central image" is 
critical, not only to freedom of the press but to freedom of speech 
generally, then Bollinger is asking us to reconsider the entire corpus of 
First Amendment jurisprudence. After all, if we can trust government 
to regulate the press in order to improve the "quality of public de-
bate," we can trust it to regulate speech as well. By targeting Sullivan 
as the root of the problem, and by defining freedom of the press as a 
right separate and distinct from freedom of speech, Bollinger creates 
the impression that he is tinkering with only one comer of the First 
7. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, q24-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (anti-war 
protest). 
8. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (subversive 
advocacy). 
9. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (subversive 
advocacy). 
10. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) Qicensing). 
11. 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (hostile audience). 
12. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (hostile audience). 
May 1992] Imagining a Free Press 1249 
Amendment. But the questions Bollinger asks us to consider about 
the legitimacy of the "central image" cannot be so easily cabined. In 
fact, the stakes may be a good deal higher than Bollinger admits. 
II 
Dean Bollinger next considers the costs of an autonomous press, 
and finds two of these costs to be prohibitively high. First, Bollinger 
argues that the Court has purchased press autonomy at too high a 
price in terms of the sacrifice of competing interests and that the Court 
has systematically undervalued the importance of such interests in or-
der to justify its results. As an illustration, Bollinger offers Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn, 13 in which the Court held that the state lacks a 
substantial interest in prohibiting the press from disclosing the identity 
of a rape victim once her identity has been made public in any way by 
officers of the state. Second, Bollinger argues that the Court has been 
inattentive to the ways in which press freedom may threaten, rather 
than enhance, the democratic process, the very value the autonomy 
model says press freedom is designed to promote. Bollinger notes that 
this threat can develop in many ways: the press can exclude important 
points of view from public debate, it can distort knowledge of public 
issues through misrepresentation, and it can promote simple-minded 
over serious discussion of ideas (pp. 26-27). Bollinger finds it "aston-
ishing" that the Court almost never seriously addresses these concerns 
(p. 34). Indeed, in many cases, the Court "seems to have gone out of 
its way - to the brink of misrepresentation - to ignore the risk that 
the press can become a threat to democracy rather than its servant" 
(p. 34). As an illustration, Bollinger offers Sullivan itself, in which the 
Court treated the state's interest in restricting libelous utterances as 
deriving entirely from the individual's interest in reputation and ig-
nored the "other strong social concerns about the quality of public 
discussion" (p. 35). The Court failed, for example, to consider the 
important public interests in preventing the distortion of political de-
bate by false statements of fact and in preventing capable individuals 
from being deterred from entering political life because of a fear that 
they will be subjected to false statements about their character or 
conduct. 
It is puzzling that Bollinger emphasizes these particular costs of an 
autonomous press, for they focus less on the actual costs of press free-
dom than on the failure of the Court to offer a full account of those 
costs. The actual costs are, of course, much broader in scope and 
much greater in magnitude than those Bollinger identifies. Consider, 
for starters, the Pentagon Papers case14 and Nebraska Press Assn. v. 
13. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
14. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (invalidating an injunction 
designed to protect the national security). 
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Stuart. 15 What really interests Bollinger is not the costs of an autono-
mous press, but what he sees as the Court's systematic undervaluation 
of those costs. 
Moreover, although such undervaluation may exist, Bollinger 
overstates his case. The Court in Cox Broadcasting did not trivialize 
the harm to the victim. Rather, it argued that whether or not that 
harm might otherwise be sufficient to justify a restraint on publication, 
the state cannot carry its burden of justification unless, at the very 
least, it takes the harm sufficiently seriously itself to prevent its own 
officers from carelessly or casually disclosing the information to the 
public. This was a sensible way for the Court to test the depth of the 
state's commitment. The Court's position was not that a limited dis-
closure of the information by officers of the state negates the harm of a 
widespread dissemination by the press. It was, rather, that the state 
should not be allowed to punish the publication of truthful informa-
tion without a very strong justification, and that the state impeaches 
the strength of its own case when it fails to take reasonable precautions 
against such disclosure. This is a familiar and a sound principle of 
constitutional law, and it is not in any way peculiar to Cox 
Broadcasting. 
Although Bollinger is also right in noting that the Court rarely 
considers the potentially adverse effects of some forms of press free-
dom on the quality of public debate, he again overstates his point. 
Whether the Court should empower the government to restrict expres-
sion that arguably undermines the democratic process turns in part on 
how far back the Court should delve into first principles. It may be 
that some propositions should be taken as given. Is it acceptable 
under the First Amendment, for example, for the government to sup-
press speech that calls for government suppression of speech? Is it 
acceptable under the Fir&t Amendment for the government to censor 
Images of a Free Press because it advocates restrictions on press 
freedom? 
I do not mean to suggest that Bollinger's observation is without 
merit. To the contrary, it is perfectly legitimate for the Court to con-
sider the argument that certain forms of press freedom may undermine 
the democratic process. But in considering such claims, the Court 
should apply the same standards it applies to any other justification for 
suppressing expression. There is nothing ironic or self-contradictory 
in protecting speech that might at some time in the future have poten-
tially undesirable effects on the "quality" of political discourse. 
For the most part, it seems to me that what the Court does in these 
cases is nothing different than what it does throughout its First 
Amendment jurisprudence - it consistently resists the temptation to 
15. 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (invalidating an order designed to protect the administration of 
justice). 
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permit speech to be suppressed or regulated because of speculative or 
overblown claims about its potentially deleterious consequences. As 
Bollinger has so eloquently observed in other contexts, that is one of 
the great strengths of our free speech tradition.16 
III 
The third step in Dean Bollinger's analysis consists of an effort to 
explain why the Court systematically understates the costs of an au-
tonomous press. At the outset, Bollinger briefly offers two very tenta-
tive explanations. First, having made up its mind to protect the press, 
the Court then succumbs to the all too human tendency to " 'argue 
sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements 
of the case, or misrepresent the opposite opinion' " to justify its re-
sults.17 This rings true. Second, the Court may have a kind of "patho-
logical fear . . . of confronting the possibility . . . that the problems 
with the press may originate with the people" (p. 39), a possibility that 
would require the Court to entertain a highly paternalistic view of the 
public in public debate. Bollinger suggests that it may be easier for the 
Court to embrace "a romantic view of the public and the press" than 
"to address ... the potentially harmful impact of speech on the quality 
of democratic decision making" (p. 39). There may be something to 
this, but I suspect that this theory is dominated by Bollinger's first 
explanation, which applies across all areas of constitutional law~ as 
does the underlying phenomenon that Bollinger seeks to explain -
less than candid opinions. 
Bollinger then offers a third explanation, one that interests him 
more and derives from a more subtle understanding of the Court and a 
more refined vision of press autonomy. Bollinger observes that the 
Court performs a deeply educative role in society and affects, through 
its opinions, the values and images citizens hold (pp. 41-42). In this 
way, the Court helps to develop a dominant conception of the role of 
the press and a consensus about the meaning of a "good" press. Bol-
linger asserts that the Court, beginning with Sullivan, has consistently 
articulated a powerful image of the press and its relation to the gov-
ernment and the public, an image in which the press "performs a vital 
role in helping . . . to reduce the risks of official incompetence and 
abuse, to convey information about the affairs of government, and to 
serve as a forum for citizens to communicate among themselves" (p. 
44). Within this image, the Court portrays the press "as playing a 
noble, even heroic, social and political role" and suffuses this image 
"with ethical content: journalists should focus their attention on the 
16. See LEE c. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EX-
TREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). 
17. P. 38 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 47 (R.B. McCallum ed., Basil 
Blackwell 1946) (1859)). 
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political issues of the day, speak the truth about official conduct, ex-
pose errors and abuse, represent the opinions of different groups, and, 
of course, avoid lies and misrepresentations" (p. 44). The Court de-
fines the stakes "in very high terms indeed: a good press is a necessary 
condition of a good democracy," for it "stands as the guardian and 
agent of the political rights of the people" and "determines the quality 
of public debate" (p. 44). Bollinger contends that the Court, by articu-
lating and reinforcing this image, directly affects the world and creates 
pressure on the press to conform to certain norms of quality 
journalism. 
Although conceding that it is difficult to measure the extent to 
which the Court's articulation of this image actually affects the press, 
Bollinger maintains that such influence exists and that it is significant 
(p. 47). To support this conclusion, Bollinger observes that the press 
depends on the Court for its rights and so remains "continuously con-
scious of the importance of having the Court ready to stand between it 
and the next mood of political repression" (p. 48). The press therefore 
has a "compelling self-interest in meeting the Court's expectations 
about its role in society" (p. 49). Moreover, because the Court influ-
ences public opinion, the press, which must attend to such opinion, is 
further affected by the Court's image of its role (p. 49). 
In Bollinger's view, much that seems strange about the autonomy 
model - including what be sees as the Court's systematic undervalua-
tion of the costs of press freedom - can be understood as part of the 
Court's effort to shape the press. The Court conceives of a free press 
as independent, unafraid, and capable of exposing society's most fun-
damental shortcomings. There are enormous pressures against the re-
alization of such a vision, however, for the "costs of exposing official 
corruption or of communicating unpleasant truths ... are often great; 
the simpler, more lucrative path is to provide simplicities and en-
tertainment" (p. 56). It is easy, in other words, "to perform badly" (p. 
56). This explains why the Court conceives of itself as an advocate for 
the press and why it understates the costs of press freedom. In a world 
in which powerful constraints threaten to stifle an aggressive and in-
dependent press, the Court's voice must be forceful and its defense of 
the press must be bold. Moreover, the extreme protection the Court 
gives the press may serve as a "metaphor for an intellectual style," for 
to "deny state regulation of the press, to declare it 'unaccountable' to 
official authority, is to emphasize its intellectual independence" (p. 
57). Bollinger concludes that "the reasons for overprotection of the 
press are not so much the ones given by New York Times v. Sullivan -
that it is necessary because the government cannot be trusted, because 
human mistakes are inevitable, or because fear of litigation leads to 
timidity - but the idea that the removal of a superior, supervising 
authority contributes to the creation of a spirit of intellectual indepen-
dence" (p. 57). Thus, as the Court goes about its everyday business of 
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deciding cases, it is "continually creating images of ... American jour-
nalism" (p. 61 ), and those images directly and indirectly shape the 
press and the public's expectations of what a good press should be. 
The underlying structure of Bollinger's argument is now clear. He 
maintains that the Court systematically understates the costs of press 
freedom. He then explains this phenomenon by offering his image of 
the Court as educator. As I have already indicated, however, it is not 
at all clear that the Court acts any differently in the press context than 
it does in most others. Indeed, so far as I can tell, the Court does not 
systematically undervalue the costs of an autonomous press any more 
than it systematically undervalued the costs of the exclusionary rule in 
the 1960s, the right of privacy in the 1970s, or the constitutional pro-
hibition of affirmative action in the 1980s. In these as in other con-
texts, Bollinger's first explanation for the Court's behavior is, for me, 
the clincher: the Court undervalues competing interests because it is 
easier to write opinions that way. 
Having said this, I hasten to add that I do not think that Bollinger 
needs to prove that the Court acts in an unusual manner in the press 
context to justify putting forth his theory of the Court as educator. To 
the contrary, his description of the Court's dialogue with the press and 
the public is an insightful and even inspiring conception of the Court's 
role in our constitutional system, and this is so whether or not it is 
uniquely tied to the Court's opinions about freedom of the press. But 
is it sound? 
Like Bollinger, I would like to believe that the Court helps shape 
our images of the press and the police, our teachers and our wardens, 
our politicians and ourselves. I would like to believe that the Court 
caft appeal to our better instincts, lift our spirits and set fire to our 
aspirations. I would like to believe that it can inspire us to be more 
careful reporters, more responsible parents, and more tolerant citizens. 
Moreover, like Bollinger, I do believe it. Granted, most citizens never 
see, let alone read, a judicial opinion. Nonetheless, what the Court 
does and says seeps into the public consciousness, and it certainly af-
fects those with a legal stake in the decisions. There are, of course, 
those who question whether the Court has any such effect. 18 Like Bol-
linger, however, I am not persuaded by their criticisms and, quite 
frankly, I don't wish to be. 
But there is a deeper problem. For although I agree with Bollinger 
that the Court can educate the press and the public through the 
images it generates in its opinions, I fear that Bollinger credits the 
Court with too much vision and too much subtlety. His image of the 
Court may be every bit as "romantic" as the Court's image of the 
press. The reasons offered in Sullivan for its fervent protection of the 
18. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor Stephen L. Carter. - Ed.). 
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press may not be the most exhilarating or philosophical, but they are 
sensible, pragmatic, and compelling. Moreover, they are the reasons 
that actually motivated the Court. Bollinger's problem is that he 
thinks the Court is as wise as he is. It is not. 
IV 
The fourth step in Dean Bollinger's analysis is his observation that, 
despite the dominance of the central image, we do not in fact have an 
autonomous press. To the contrary, much of this century has seen 
extensive government regulation of broadcasting. What Bollinger 
finds striking is that, despite this fact, we have clung tenaciously to the 
central image. "[P]sychologically," we have failed to acknowledge 
that "the broadcast media are highly regulated and that they are an 
integral part of the American 'press' " (p. 62). 
Bollinger notes that the Court has provided the most forceful de-
fense of broadcast regulation and that its decisions have both shaped 
and defined that experience. Moreover, in defending broadcast regula-
tion the Court has offered nothing less "than a complete conceptual 
reordering of the relationships between the government, the press, and 
the public that was established with New York Times v. Sullivan" (p. 
66). The pivotal decision was, of course, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 19 which was to broadcast regulation what Sullivan was to the 
principle of journalistic autonomy. 
In Red Lion, the Court reaffirmed the traditional scarcity rationale 
for broadcast regulation20 and went on to observe that, in the broad-
cast context, "[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right 
of the broadcasters, which is paramount."21 Indeed, there "is nothing 
in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requir-
ing a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct him-
self as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and 
voices which are representative of his community and which would 
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves."22 Bollinger 
notes that the "most striking feature" of Red Lion was "the Court's 
virtual celebration of public regulation" (p. 71). To read Red Lion is 
"to step into another world, one that encompasses a dramatically dif-
ferent way of thinking about the press and about the role of public 
regulation" (p. 72). Red Lion "reads like a tract that treats the press 
as the most serious threat to the ultimate First Amendment goal, the 
creation of an intelligent and informed democratic electorate" (p. 72). 
In "the triumvirate of parties that inhabit this universe, the public 
19. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
20. The Court first enunciated this rationale in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 
319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
21. 395 U.S. at 390. 
22. 395 U.S. at 389. 
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stands at the top and broadcasters at the bottom," while the govern-
ment, "in the middle, executes the will of the people to insure that 
broadcasters provide adequate service to the realm of public debate" 
(p. 73). Thus, contrary to popular belief, we have never had a modem 
press largely free of government control. Rather, we have had, and 
continue to have, a dual system in which only one branch of the press 
is autonomous. 
v 
Dean Bollinger begins the fifth stage of his analysis by observing 
that this dual system is today undergoing extensive reevaluation (p. 
86). With the abandonment of the scarcity rationale for broadcast reg-
ulation, the central question has become whether the press should be 
made unitary and, if so, which model should prevail. Bollinger notes 
that the weight of opinion seems to have moved toward adopting the 
autonomous press model for the press as a whole (p. 86). Conceding 
that this model has worked reasonably well in the dual system we have 
had until now, Bollinger argues that the autonomous press model 
would not serve as well if the electronic media were permitted to oper-
ate under its principles, too. 
Bollinger observes that, for most of its history, broadcast regula-
tion has been treated as a largely uncontroversial and isolated phe-
nomenon, so distinct from the rest of the press that it has seemed to 
have little impact beyond its own borders (p. 90). Viewed in that light, 
the extension of the autonomous press model to broadcasting would 
not seem likely to have any significant consequences for the print me-
dia. Bollinger argues, however, that it is not that simple, for "[t]he 
relationship between the electronic media and its treatment and the 
print media and its treatment has been subtle, shifting, and reciprocal" 
(p. 93). In fact, the "broadcast experience has not been simply a mar-
ginal enterprise" (p. 85), for as broadcasting has undergone continuing 
experimentation with public regulation, print journalism has lived 
under the constant threat that such regulation will become the domi-
nant approach for the future. As a result, the broadcast experience 
"has exerted a profound influence over . . . the behavior of . . . the 
'autonomous' print media" (p. 85), and the values "of fairness and 
balance in journalism" may continually have been reinforced in the 
print media by their "very real - and looming - regulatory presence 
in the broadcast media context" (p. 96). Bollinger warns that, viewed 
from this perspective, a decision to eliminate broadcast regulation 
could indirectly but significantly undermine the commitment to such 
values throughout the press (pp. 96-99). 
Building upon his earlier work,23 Bollinger maintains that the ex-
23. Bollinger, supra note 2. 
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isting dual system in fact makes good sense in terms of both public 
policy and First Amendment theory because there are compelling rea-
sons for being both receptive to and wary of regulation. The Court 
should not be forced into an "all-or-nothing" position, for we can have 
the "best of both worlds" (p. 110). 
In defending his theory of partial regulation, Bollinger contends 
that access regulation, exemplified by the fairness doctrine, both re-
sponds to constitutional traditions and cuts against them (p. 110). On 
the one hand, such regulation helps realize First Amendment. goals by 
neutralizing disparities that impede the proper functioning of the mar-
ketplace of ideas and by equalizing opportunities to command an audi-
ence and to mobilize public opinion. Bollinger argues that these are 
important goals because unrestrained private interests can hamper the 
free exchange of ideas as severely as government censors. Access reg-
ulation directly addresses this concern by limiting the capacity of pri-
vate power centers to control - and to distort - public debate. 
On the other hand, Bollinger recognizes that access regulation con-
stitutes a significant departure from our traditional constitutional 
norms concerning the need to maintain a distance between the govern-
ment and the press. Such regulation can have at least three adverse 
consequences. First, it can chill journalistic motivation to address 
controversial issues of public importance. Second, it can necessitate 
the establishment of an administrative machinery that can be abused 
to force the press into an official line. Third, it can open the door to 
ever more oppressive press restrictions (pp. 111-13). 
Because he sees access regulation as both desirable and dangerous, 
Bollinger concludes that a dual system of partial regulation offers im-
portant advantages over either complete regulation or complete 
nonregulation. Bollinger thus contends that the Court, by accepting 
the existing system of partial regulation, "has imposed a compromise, 
not based on notions of expedience but on a reasoned, principled, ac-
commodation of competing First Amendment values" (p. 116). This 
system permits both "experimentation and the manifestation of ambiv-
alence," both of which are healthy (p. 117). Bollinger emphatically 
rejects the claim that a system manifesting such ambivalence violates 
the virtue of consistency or impermissibly discriminates against the 
broadcast media. In his view, such differential treatment is acceptable 
because it "reflects no animus toward broadcasters" (p. 117) and be-
cause a concern with consistency in this context is "unduly fastidious" 
(p. 118). Bollinger warns that we must not allow ourselves to "be in-
tellectually crippled by the charge of inconsistency" (p. 118). 
I have puzzled over Bollinger's theory of partial regulation ever 
since he first articulated it fifteen years ago. Quite frankly, I have 
never managed to persuade myself that it is persuasive. Call me "un-
duly fastidious" but, in my judgment, the argument is "intellectually 
May 1992] Imagining a Free Press 1257 
crippled" by its failure to come to grips with the charge of 
inconsistency. 
Bollinger argues that broadcast regulation does not reflect any "an-
imus towards broadcasters." It is probably true that there was no 
such animus when Congress first enacted broadcast regulation, for 
there were few if any broadcasters and, in any event, the initial regula-
tors clearly accepted the scarcity rationale as a compelling reason for 
regulation. With the universal abandonment of the scarcity rationale, 
however, the decision to retain broadcast regulation may well be 
tainted by "animus," if animus is generously defined. The retention of 
broadcast regulation serves at least two quite suspect purposes - it 
protects the commercial interests of the competing media, and it ren-
ders broadcasters vulnerable to the oversight and possible manipula-
tion of federal regulators and politicians. I do not know precisely 
what Bollinger means by animus in this context, but it is difficult to 
ignore these two problematic influences in the decision to continue 
broadcast regulation long after the abandonment of its initiaj 
rationale. 
Moreover, and more important, the presence or absence of animus 
hardly ends the inquiry. Otherwise, virtually all of our equal protec-
tion and much of our First Amendment jurisprudence would go by the 
boards. The constitutional concern with equal treatment is about 
more than merely preventing government discrimination based on ani-
mus. 24 This is not to say, however, that the government can never 
treat different means of communication differently. To the contrary, 
the Court has "long recognized that each medium of expression 
presents special First Amendment problems."25 It is not unconstitu-
tional, for example, for the government to permit leafleting but not 
loudspeakers in an airport terminal. But such differential treatment 
must be based upon real differences in the methods of communication, 
and those differences must be directly relevant to the interests the gov-
ernment seeks to further. With the abandonment of the scarcity ra-
tionale for treating the electronic media differently from the print 
media, we are left with no relevant difference between these two means 
of communication that would justify subjecting one, but not the other, 
to regulation. This is hardly an "unduly fastidious" concern with con-
sistency. It is rather the very essence of the fundamental precept that 
the government may not treat similarly situated individuals - or insti-
tutions - differently. 
Bollinger's "best of both worlds" argument is superficially quite 
seductive. It is fundamentally incompatible, however, with the basic 
24. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46 
(1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 189 (1983). 
25. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
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premises of our First Amendment jurisprudence. To say that there are 
competing approaches to a problem and that each has certain advan-
tages and disadvantages is merely to say that competing interests are 
at stake. That is always the case in constitutional adjudication. To 
say that there is no reason to deny ourselves the best of both worlds by 
accommodating the competing interests is merely to say that we 
should engage in ad hoc, open-ended balancing, a form of analysis that 
has long been rejected in First Amendment doctrine. Restrictions on 
political expression that significantly and discriminatorily limit jour-
nalistic freedom are and should be presumptively unconstitutional. To 
sustain such restrictions, the government must bear a heavy burden of 
justification. It is no answer to say: "We'll compromise by inflicting 
the restrictions on only some speakers." We have never permitted 
such experimentation, such self-indulgence of our "ambivalence," 
when considering the constitutionality of significant and discrimina-
tory restrictions on free expression. There is no reason to begin here. 
In fact, Bollinger's conclusion that we should permit the govern-
ment to regulate the electronic but not the print media is nothing short 
of arbitrary. Indeed, in his earlier work Bollinger expressly asserted 
that his theory of "partial regulation could be applied to any portion 
of the media" and that the government could decide at will "to shift 
from regulation of broadcasting to regulation of newspapers" (p. 120). 
In Images of a Free Press, however, Bollinger retracts that view - he 
now believes that it would be unconstitutional to reverse the existing 
situation. In other words, "partial regulation" for now and ever more 
means regulation only of the "newer (electronic) media" (p. 120). But 
why? Without the scarcity rationale, there is simply no legitimate rea-
son to impose the burdens of regulation on broadcast rather than on 
print journalism. 
That, however, is only the tip of the problem. Bollinger considers 
the regulatory choice to be between the broadcast and print media. 
But if we are to live in the "best" of all worlds, why isn't our choice 
much broader? Why can't we choose to regulate all of the press, but 
not speech? Why can't we choose to regulate only cable television? 
Only broadcast television? Only magazines? Everything but 
magazines? Everything but cable? The opportunities to design the 
best of all worlds are virtually without limit. Would any of these 
choices violate the First Amendment? If so, which ones, and why? In 
Bollinger's realm of arbitrary choices to achieve the best of all worlds, 
there is not only "no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the 
press," there is no law. Indeed, it is revealing that in discussing Red 
Lion Bollinger enthusiastically applauds the Court for acting "as if it 
were reviewing a decision of an ordinary administrative agency" (p. 
73). But that hardly seems the appropriate judicial stance for deciding 
whether the government may extensively regulate some, but not other, 
elements of the press. 
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One might argue that the decision to regulate broadcast but not 
print journalism makes sense even after the abandonment of the scar-
city rationale because partial regulation has worked well in the past 
and has not appreciably impaired the freedom of the regulated media. 
On this view, the otherwise arbitrary decision to regulate the broad-
cast but not the print media is defensible because such differential 
treatment serves important societal interests at no real sacrifice of the 
rights of those who are subjected to regulation. But even if this argu-
ment is sensible in theory, it is implausible in fact. As the Court made 
clear in its unanimous decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 26 the type of access regulation that Bollinger endorses for the 
broadcast press significantly restricts journalistic freedom. Such regu-
lation seriously limits the freedom of broadcasters relative to that of 
print journalists. In light of Tornillo, such regulations can hardly be 
dismissed as de minimis. Even a cursory glance at the differences be-
tween broadcast and print journalism reveals the impact of govern-
ment regulation. By comparison with the unregulated media, 
broadcasting is bland, cautious, and studiously nonpolitical. Broad-
casters do not endorse political candidates and they do not stake out 
controversial positions on issues of public importance. There can be 
no doubt that these differences are due in part to the effects of regula-
tion. Directly and indirectly, government regulation makes broadcast-
ers less willing to participate vigorously in public debate. Indeed, 
recognizing that the fairness doctrine may chill more speech than it 
fosters, even the FCC now calls for a return to the free market system 
for broadcasting.27 Although Bollinger challenges this conclusion, his 
responses are insufficient to justify the discriminatory imposition of 
significant restrictions on only some members of the press (pp. 120-
28). 
One might argue further, I suppose, that the "best of both worlds" 
approach is uniquely appropriate in this context because there are 
First Amendment interests on both sides of the balance. As Bollinger 
observes, journalistic autonomy has certain advantages for the system 
of free expression, as does government regulation. To embrace either 
"extreme" may produce less effective public debate than a best of both 
worlds approach and thus frustrate the underlying goals of the First 
Amendment. In such circumstances, we are faced less with a conflict 
of competing interests than with a need to meld two competing models 
to produce the best possible First Amendment result. But this proves 
too much. On this view of constitutional law, the government could 
justify allowing school prayer for students who want to pray on the 
theory that such a policy accommodates the competing free exercise 
26. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a right-of-reply statute as applied to print media). 
27. Federal Communications Commission, General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad-
cast Licensees, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,418 (1985). 
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and establishment interests, thus giving us the best of both worlds. 
Similarly, the government could justify racial segregation in at least 
some of our public schools on the plea that such a policy accommo-
dates the competing constitutional interests in freedom of association 
and racial equality, thus giving us the best of both worlds. And, on 
this view, the government could justify waiving the protections of New 
York Times v. Sullivan in libel actions brought by black or other mi-
nority political candidates on the plea that such a policy accommo-
dates the competing constitutional interests in free expression and in 
expanding the opportunities for minority candidates, again giving us 
the best of both worlds. 
I could go on, but the point is clear. The "best of both worlds" 
argument is an invitation to constitutional disaster. It cannot redeem 
a departure from the essential First Amendment principle that the 
government may not selectively impose significant restrictions on the 
political speech of some speakers, but not others, in the absence of an 
important difference between the speakers that directly furthers a sub-
stantial governmental interest. 
Finally, I should note that even if Bollinger's partial regulation 
theory were otherwise sound, it is nonetheless seriously underinclusive 
as an effective response to many of the problems that plague our polit-
ical discourse today. The theory of partial regulation was the product 
of thinking about the fairness doctrine and similar forms of access reg-
ulation to address one particular concern - the underrepresentation 
of unconventional points of view in the mass media. But the theory is 
wholly inadequate to deal with a host of equally important concerns, 
many of which certainly trouble Bollinger, such as the tendency of the 
media to treat political campaigns as sporting events, to trivialize pub-
lic discussion, and to sensationalize private facts about political candi-
dates, all to the detriment of our political process. Any serious effort 
to address the failures of the press today must come to grips with these 
concerns, as well as with the issue of access. The theory of partial 
regulation does not reach these issues and would not enable us to con-
front them effectively. 
VI 
The final step in Dean Bollinger's analysis calls for a "new image" 
of the idea of freedom of the press (p. 133). Under the "primitive" 
image of Sullivan, "the goal of press freedom [was] viewed as the crea-
tion of a vast space for 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' public 
discussion," and it was "assumed that the role of the Supreme Court is 
to stand guard against government intervention, permitting it only 
when the public interest counters with an overwhelming competing 
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interest to that of free and open debate."28 Bollinger maintains that 
this approach is "insensitive to problems affecting the quality of public 
discussion that are posed by a laissez-faire system of modern mass me-
dia" (p. 133) and that before "we can be clearheaded in thinking about 
the great issues involving the press and the quality of public debate" 
we must develop "a new theoretical perspective" (p. 136). 
In articulating this new perspective, Bollinger begins with the 
FCC's call for the abandonment of the fairness doctrine. In its 1985 
report, the FCC reasoned that, with the proliferation of broadcast out-
lets and the emergence of new forms of print media, the fear of con-
centration that gave rise to government regulation was no longer 
reasonable (p. 136). Bollinger argues that this conclusion was pre-
mised on the faulty assumption "that the only acceptable rationale for 
public regulation must stem from some form of market failure" (p. 
137). Bollinger identifies two now familiar objections to this assump-
tion. First, because "the market for freedom of the press necessarily 
exists within the larger context of a market for goods and services ... 
[c]itizens arrive at the system of press freedom with vast inequalities of 
wealth and, therefore, with very different abilities to participate effec-
tively in public debate" (p. 137). Second, because "there 'is no neces-
sary, or even probabilistic, relationship between making a profit (or 
allocating resources efficiently) and supplying the electorate with the 
information they need to make free and intelligent choices about gov-
ernment policy,'" there is a serious "conflict between the interests of 
those who manage for-profit media institutions and the interests of the 
democratic society in ensuring that citizens are supplied the informa-
tion and ideas they ought to have."29 
In Bollinger's view, these criticisms, though powerful, "do not pro-
vide as full and clear a picture as we need to determine the appropriate 
role of the state in mediating the deficiencies of a free press in the 
context of a free market system" (p. 138). Rather, they "represent 
only an intermediate step toward a deeper, more fundamental under-
standing" (p. 138). Bollinger explains that we "must address the na-
ture of our own behavior in the discussion of public questions" and 
that we must "be concerned about the character of our demands in the 
market" (p. 139). Indeed, we "have good reasons to be wary of our-
selves, and we should fear not just the failures of the market system 
but our own failures of intellect," for a "democratic society, like an 
individual, should strive to remain conscious of the biases that skew, 
distort, and corrupt its own thinking about public issues" (p. 139). 
Thus, "even in a world in which the press is entirely free and open to 
all voices, with a perfect market in that sense, human nature would 
still see to it that quality public debate and decision making would not 
28. P. 133 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
29. P. 137 (quoting Owen Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987)). 
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rise naturally to the surface but would, in all probability, need the 
buoyant support of some form of collective action by citizens, involv-
ing public institutions" (p. 139). As an example, Bollinger cites our 
criminal justice system, in which "we go to great lengths to ensure the 
decision-making process is purified of biases, and we recognize that an 
entirely laissez-faire system is likely to produce great injustice" (p. 
140). Bollinger speculates that we accept the extraordinary con-
straints in this context, exemplified by the rules of evidence, "because 
we understand that the stakes are so high for the individual defend-
ant" (p. 140). He maintains that we should think the same way about 
democracy. Indeed, it "should be considered a sign of high intellec-
tual development when a society is able to take steps to correct those 
problems within itself that interfere with quality decision making" (p. 
140). 
Although conceding that the mass media may "give viewers and 
readers what they 'want,' or demand, through the expression of their 
preferences in the marketplace," Bollinger finds it nonetheless imagi-
nable "that we - the same 'we' that issue our marketplace votes for 
what we get - might be very concerned about how we are behaving, 
about what choices we are making, in that system" (p. 141). Accord-
ingly, we may "decide together, through public regulation, that we 
would like to alter or modify the demands we find ourselves making in 
that market context," for we may "recognize that if we are left to 
choose on our own whether and how to inform ourselves, too many 
will neglect to undertake the burdens of self-education, choosing in-
stead to pursue more pleasant things" (p. 141). 
Bollinger argues that "it would be a more advanced society, a more 
advanced democratic society, that could act to correct deficiencies 
arising out of the ... citizens themselves" (pp. 141-42). He maintains 
that such regulation should not be condemned as elitist or paternalis-
tic, for it "is not paternalism when a majority of a society recognizes 
that its own intellectual limitations call for some institutional or struc-
tural correctives" (p. 144). Bollinger concludes that an approach to 
government regulation stemming from a "self-conscious awareness" of 
our own frailties and biases in order to promote a higher level of pub-
lic discussion and decisionmaking would "be a great and important 
advance in the history of press freedom" (pp. 144-45). 
It is in his articulation of this approach that Bollinger offers his 
most important contribution. His vision of freedom of the press and 
of its relation to public institutions and to the character of the Ameri-
can people represents a significant step forward. By emphasizing the 
need to address failings in our national character, this approach 
presents a vision of government intervention that is designed to im-
prove the press, the political process, and the people. 
Bollinger's analogy to the criminal justice system is especially pow-
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erful. As Bollinger notes, we exclude all sorts of evidence from the 
consideration of the jury in its decision of important questions of fact 
(p. 140). We do this for many reasons. Sometimes, as in the context 
of the attorney-client privilege, we exclude relevant evidence because 
its probative value is outweighed by the harm that its admission would 
cause to extrajudicial interests, such as the confidentiality of the privi-
leged relationship. In other situations, we exclude evidence because 
we fear that jurors will exaggerate its probative value. We generally 
exclude evidence of prior convictions of criminal defendants, for ex-
ample, because, in the jargon of the law of evidence, the probative 
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue 
prejudice to the defendant. In such circumstances, we conclude that 
jurors are more likely to reach a fair and accurate result if they are 
denied access to the evidence completely. Bollinger asks us to con-
sider extending this approach to the democratic system. 
Consider the following extension of the analogy. Traditionally, the 
press did not report information about the private sexual conduct of 
political candidates. In exercising such discretion, the press acted like 
a judge in a criminal trial, preventing the people - the jurors - from 
learning information that arguably would distort their judgment and 
distract their attention from more important matters. Today, how-
ever, as part of a general breakdown of journalistic standards, the 
press, driven by rampant commercialism, routinely sensationalizes 
such information to the (arguable) detriment of the political process. 
In its defense, the press argues that it would be irresponsible not to 
report such information, pointing to polls indicating that perhaps fif-
teen percent of the public would not vote for a candidate who engaged 
in such activity. But on the same theory, the press presumably would 
have to argue that because seven percent of the public would not vote 
for a candidate who engaged in oral sex with his spouse, it must dis-
close that information, too. Similarly, because five percent of the peo-
ple would not vote for a candidate who did not shower or change his 
socks everyday, or wear pajamas to bed, the press would have to re-
gard those facts, too, as appropriate for public disclosure. There must 
be some limit, h9wever, and this limit must be designed not only to 
respect the legitimate privacy interests of candidates, but also to reflect 
our right, as a society, to decide that some matters simply should not 
play a significant role in our political process, even if some of our fel-
low citizens disagree. And our right to make such a decision should 
be strongest when, as in the trial context, the information has a greater 
potential to distract and distort than to inform our better judgment. 
As in the trial context, we should be able to protect the political pro:. 
cess against our own failures of judgment. 
Bollinger has offered us an innovative and powerful new image of 
freedom of the press. It merits serious consideration. In that vein, I 
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would like to venture a few tentative observations. First, although 
Bollinger does not seem to note this himself, his new vision of freedom 
of the press is much broader than his theory of partial regulation. It 
offers no justification for continued discrimination against the broad-
cast press. It does, however, provide a strong rationale for enabling 
the government to reach a much broader range of concerns than those 
addressed by mere access regulation. It offers a more principled and 
less arbitrary foundation on which to build a bolder and more innova-
tive theory of government regulation of the press. 
Second, Bollinger maintains that his new approach is neither pa-
ternalistic nor elitist. This is at least questionable. The mere fact that 
"a majority of us" agrees to enact restrictions on what the press may 
report does not mean that the restrictions are not elitist or paternalis-
tic. Bollinger seems to assume that there is no paternalism in these 
circumstances because those supporting the restrictions do so in recog-
nition of their own frailties. They are, in effect, tying their own hands 
by denying themselves access to information they fear they themselves 
might otherwise abuse. In truth, however, many if not most of those 
who would support such restrictions probably think themselves per-
fectly capable of handling the information at issue. It is the "others" 
they worry about. In this sense, at least, such restrictions cannot es-
cape the taint of paternalism. Moreover, the minority of citizens who 
are prevented from obtaining information they consider useful in mak-
ing their own political decisions are certainly the victims of elitism 
insofar as the "majority" finds that judgment inappropriate. It does 
not further the analysis to insist that such regulations are not elitist or 
paternalistic. At least in a subtle way, they are. The important - and 
difficult - task is to determine when a "majority of us" has the right, 
if ever, to decide that certain information about political candidates is 
not to play a role in political debate, even though "a minority of us" 
disagrees. 
Third, although Bollinger puts forth his new image with considera-
ble conviction, in the end he adopts a tentative stance, noting that it is 
uncertain whether our society is sufficiently "advanced" to embrace 
this theory, and that the essential "question is whether the government 
can be trusted with the power to intervene into the field of public de-
bate" (p. 142). Bollinger is wise to recognize the risks in his approach 
and to doubt whether the government "can be trusted" to implement 
it. There is some irony in this, of course, for at its very core Images of 
a Free Press directly challenges Sullivan's "central image" by attack-
ing Sullivan's distrust of government regulation of the press. 
On the other hand, although there may be some tension in Bollin-
ger's ultimate distrust of government, it is also true that he is prepared 
seriously to consider whether we should grant government a good deal 
more discretion than we have in the past. For those who, like myself, 
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generally accept Sullivan's central image, this is a disquieting prospect. 
I am convinced by Bollinger and others, 30 however, that it is time to 
ask some hard questions about our political process. If we are unwill-
ing to trust government to regulate the press, we must be content to 
leave the critical decisions to the press. But it is no longer clear to me 
that a society dedicated to maintaining an effective, fair, and open 
political process should delegate the decision of such fundamental 
questions concerning the structure and nature of our political dis-
course to the unelected, unrepresentative members of the private press. 
It is one thing to guarantee and protect freedom of speech and of the 
press. It is at least arguably another thing entirely to cede to the press 
the essentially unrestrained authority to determine the basic ground 
rules of our democratic process. Viewed in that light, the critical ques-
tion is not whether we should trust the government to regulate the 
press, but whether we should trust the press to define our political 
process. We must understand that the choice that confronts us is 
more subtle and more difficult than whether we want the government 
to control the press. It is a choice between two competing power cen-
ters - one subject to political control, the other controlled increas-
ingly by the market. That, in any event, is the choice and the 
challenge that Bollinger offers us in Images of a Free Press. 
Throughout this work, Bollinger refers admiringly to a 1947 report 
on the condition of press freedom in the United States.31 This report, 
which was the work of a prestigious commission chaired by Robert M. 
Hutchins, then Chancellor of the University of Chicago, concluded 
that the press "is not meeting the needs of our society."32 Although 
the Commission stopped short of calling for full-scale government reg-
ulation, it emphasized that freedom of the press must be understood as 
a "conditional right" extended by the people to the press; it is not a 
law of nature, but a means of securing the advantages that "an autono-
mous press can provide a democratic society."33 We have granted the 
press extraordinary protection for extraordinary reasons - reasons 
that go to the very core of our self-governing process. On this view, 
freedom of the press is a means to an end, and a press that fails to 
serve the ends for which it is free may lose that freedom. As the 
Hutchins Commission observed, no "democracy . . . will indefinitely 
tolerate concentrations of private power irresponsible and strong 
enough to thwart the aspirations of the people."34 
It is time "to establish a modern sequel to the Hutchins commis-
30. See Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255 (1992); Fiss, supra note 29. 
31. See CoMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND REsPONSIBLE PRESS 
(1947). 
32. Id. at 68. 
33. Id. at 12. 
34. Id. at 80. 
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sion" (p. 135) in order to study the performance of the press today and 
to consider more fully the complex and important questions posed in 
Images of a Free Press. I can think of no more thoughtful or more 
knowledgeable person to chair that commission than Lee Bollinger. 
